ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
This article was motivated by our investigation of a particular information system (IS) innovation known as CPFR (Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment) used by interdependent organizations to improve supply chain performance. Proponents repeatedly referred to CPFR as a standard or as standards-based, but we could not see exactly how the standards label applied or how it added value relative to other ways of looking at the innovation. (As explained later, CPFR also can be analyzed as a business philosophy, methodology, and set of technologies.) Knowing that conceptual labels can affect researchers' observations and analytic insights, we decided to compare several partially overlapping conceptual perspectives and apply them to this innovation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The label standard can be applied to such entities as products, processes, services, materials, equipment, systems, interfaces, protocols, functions, methods, and activities (de Vries, 1999) . Regarding IS and information technology (IT), the term standard can be applied to technology specifications or products such as GSM (Iversen, 2000) or the Windows operating system, to methodologies such as ISO 9000 (Brunsson et al., 2000) or the Capability Maturity Model of software development, to business processes such as those addressed by the RosettaNet Consortium, and so forth. Calling these entities standards implies that they differ in essential ways from nonstandardized specifications, products, methodologies, processes, and so forth. This observation raises questions about the overlaps and unique contributions of dif-
Figure 1.
Socially constructed set of goals, causal attributions, and justifications for a proposed course of action; broadly shared idea about the application of an IS innovation Emerges over time through discourse and negotiation among actors, often with conflicting interests; may exhibit a life cycle or career from first proposal through popularity (widespread adoption) to decline Emergent process of sharing an organizing vision is similar to the emergent norms version of standards theory but not to the version of standards theory that emphasizes deliberate design/selection Visions are emergent and often implicit in contrast to many standards that are deliberately designed or selected and explicitly recorded; visions have careers in which they can change in response to experience; visions need not deal with matching problems, whereas standards do Methodology, procedure, process
Organized collection of IT-related concepts, methods, techniques, beliefs, and so forth; codified set of goal-oriented procedures intended to guide the work and cooperation of various parties Specifically designed or selected to achieve uniformity and/or compatibility; often believed to be necessary and sufficient for success; however, IT methodologies rarely are followed faithfully in practice but rather are heavily customized to local conditions, if followed at all Methodology theory and standards theory have similar notions of deliberate development or selection, explicit recording, common purpose of solving matching problems, and voluntary (vs.
mandated) implementation
Methodologies often are viewed as the best or only way to accomplish a goal, whereas standards often are viewed as somewhat arbitrary in the sense that another solution could be equally good; methodology theory emphasizes the likelihood of customization and the rarity of widespread adoption in contrast to the expectation that standards will be adopted widely as published 
Standard, standardization
Deliberate acceptance by group of people with common interests or backgrounds of a quantifiable metric that influences their behavior and activities by permitting a common interchange; limited set of solutions to actual or potential matching problems directed at benefits for the party or parties involved, balancing their needs and intending and expecting that these solutions will be repeatedly or continuously used during a certain period by a substantial number of the parties for whom they are intended Standards can emerge over time through repeated interactions among interdependent organizations or through market forces; they can be dictated by a government body, or they can be designed or selected by a formal standards body, a consortium of organizations, an industry sector, or a specific company; emergent standards are often implicit, rather than explicit; deliberately designed or selected standards are usually explicit and voluntary; not all standards exhibit network effects, but some certainly do Standards theory covers both emergent and designed/selected standards; can be applied to IS innovations at multiple levels of abstraction; emphasizes the actors involved in creating designed/selected standards; generally focuses either on the development of standards or on standards implementation, with limited efforts to bridge the two Table 1 . Four conceptual categories related to IS innovations compared ferent conceptual labels applied to the same phenomenon.
There is as much debate about the definitions of core concepts in the IS field (Alter, 2005; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001) as about the definitions of standards and standardization (Brunsson et al., 2000; de Vries, 1999; Soderstrom, 2002) . Nevertheless, IS innovations can be analyzed at multiple levels of abstraction with concepts such as philosophy, paradigm, and organizing vision, at the most abstract; concepts such as tools, techniques, and technical infrastructures at the most concrete; and concepts such as methodology, procedure, and process at an intermediate level of abstraction (Iivari et al., 2001) . When a philosophy or idea about how an IS innovation should work in practice is extremely well understood, software tools and technologies can be developed to embody those ideas. When the idea or philosophy is less understood, it is sometimes possible to specify procedures and methodologies without necessarily being able to concretize these processes in software tools.
Despite the multiplicity of labels and definitions, considerable theory and empirical research have emerged around each of the four conceptual perspectives examined in this article and depicted in Figure 1: (1) philosophy (frame, organizing vision); (2) methodology (procedure, process); (3) tools (techniques, technical infrastructure); and (4) standard (standardization). Although space does not permit an exhaustive review of prior theory and research, we try to capture the spirit of each literature. Table  1 summarizes the discussion, providing a definition of each conceptual category, a sketch of relevant theory and research, and an analysis of the similarities and differences among the conceptual lenses. Swanson and Ramiller (1997) defined organizing vision as an idea or philosophy, held by members of an organizational community, about how adopters should apply an IS innovation. Similar notions include technology frames (Iacono & Kling, 2001; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) and paradigms (Iivari et al., 2001) . Examples include the notion that organizations should conduct clean-sheet business process redesign (i.e., business process reengineering), manage their customer relationships strategically (i.e., customer relationship management), and integrate core enterprise systems (i.e., enterprise resource planning). Organizing visions that center on the business problems innovations purport to solve and often predate workable solutions that companies can implement. Constructed through discourse (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001 ), organizing visions serve to mobilize resources (e.g., encouraging vendors to develop enabling software) and to legitimize innovation, promoting widespread adoption (Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002) . Organizing visions evolve over time, as influential parties (e.g., vendors or industry associations) promote their views, and practical experience accumulates. Organizing visions have careers in which they rise or fall in popularity, eventually being replaced (Ramiller & Swanson, 2003; Swanson, 2002) .
Philosophy (Frame, Organizing Vision)

Methodology (Procedure, Process)
Methodologies are defined as "codified set[s] of goal-oriented 'procedures' … intended to guide the work and cooperation of … various parties" (Iivari et al., 2001, p. 186) . Examples include software development and business process reengineering methodologies. Methodologies are more concrete than philosophies (Iivari et al., 2001 ) and, thus, can be viewed as a later stage in the evolution of IS innovations, characterized by more certain knowledge of cause-effect relationships. In contrast, with organizing visions that emerge through interaction, methodologies are specifically designed (or selected) to achieve uniformity and/or compatibility in practice (Brunsson et al., 2000) . Methodology developers often believe that following prescribed procedures is necessary and suffi-cient for success, and that not following methodologies properly leads to failure (Harrington, 1998; Wynekoop & Russo, 1993) . However, some researchers describe methodologies as convenient fictions that present an image of control and as too mechanistic to guide practitioners' actions successfully (Nandhakumar & Avison, 1999) . Thus, methodologies may be beneficial not for detailed, step-by-step procedures but rather for essential principles and practices, which can be (and usually are) customized to local conditions (Brunsson et al., 2000; Iivari et al., 2001) . (A similar theme is found in the literature on EDI standards [cf. Damsgaard & Truex, 2000] ). Some research shows that although using a methodology produces superior results to not using one, competing methodologies do not differ greatly in performance (Howard et al., 1999) .
Technology (Tool, Technical Infrastructure)
The IS literature differentiates two technology elements: tools (e.g., software and devices) used by work system participants and technical infrastructures (e.g., computer networks and programming languages) shared by several work systems (Alter, 2005) . The distinction between tools and technical infrastructures is fuzzy (Alter, 2005) , but tool use has been found more beneficial when tools are well integrated with other work system elements such as business processes (Clark & Stoddard, 1996; Lee, Pak, & Lee, 2003) and with well-designed technical infrastructures (Truman, 2000; Zhu, 2004) . Like methodologies, tools and infrastructures are designed to achieve particular goals (Ross, 2003) , although they can exhibit evolutionary processes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Orlikowski, 2000) . Early in their lifecycles, much variation exists in the designs of tools and infrastructures; eventually, dominant designs emerge, spurring widespread adoption (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) . Adoption of tools and technical infrastructures also often exhibits network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1985) .
Standard (Standardization)
Standards are defined as "limited set[s] of solutions to actual or potential matching problems directed at benefits for the party or parties involved, balancing their needs and intending and expecting that these solutions will be repeatedly or continuously used during a certain period by a substantial number of the parties for whom they are meant" (de Vries, 1999, p. 13). Standardization often is defined as deliberate design or selection (e.g., the activity of establishing and recording a standard) (de Vries, 1999) or deliberate acceptance by group of people (Cargill, 1989) . Consequently, standards usually are viewed as explicit statements of expected behavior, with which compliance is voluntary (Brunsson et al., 2000) . However, some authors suggest that products and processes can emerge as implicit norms and come to appear standardized (i.e., similar or compatible) through repeated interaction (Brunsson et al., 2000) , imitation, or coercion. In contrast with methodologies that often are assumed the best (or only) way to achieve particular goals, standards (and norms) are viewed as essentially arbitrary in that another solution might work equally well. Not all standards exhibit network effects (de Vries, 1999), but technology standards often do (David & Greenstein, 1990) .
Similarities and Differences Among the Perspectives
The philosophy lens emphasizes evolutionary processes by which organizing visions emerge. Consequently, it overlaps only with the view of standards as implicit norms or emergent behaviors. It differs considerably from standards theory, emphasizing explicit design, consensus selection, and formal recording. Whereas the standards lens emphasizes solutions to matching problems, the organizing vision concept is broader and not limited to problems of similarity and compatibility. Furthermore, philosophies are viewed as having careers, in which they are shaped or disconfirmed by accumulating experience.
The methodology lens is similar to the standards lens in that both emphasize deliberate design or selection, explicit recording, solutions to matching problems, and voluntary compliance. A key difference is that methodologies often are viewed as the best or only ways to accomplish goals, whereas standards often are seen as arbitrary solutions. Standards theory emphasizes desirability of compliance and expectations of widespread adoption; by contrast, methodology literature emphasizes frequency of customization and rarity of widespread adoption.
The technology lens is similar to the standards lens in emphasizing deliberate design and selection; the emergent versions of technology theory employ the notions of dominant designs and network effects, also overlapping with some of the standards literature. A key difference is that the technology perspective explicitly differentiates between tools and technical infrastructures, allowing for the possibility of standardized tools coexisting with nonstandardized technical infrastructures.
When both the emergent (norms) and explicit (design/selection) versions of standards theory are considered, the standards lens considerably overlaps all three other levels of abstraction lenses. Even so, the other lenses retain potential analytic leverage. More so than the other lenses, standards theory highlights the role of actors (e.g., standards development organizations, vendor consortia, industry associations, governments) in developing explicit standards. Although the focus on actors is a significant strength, its potential drawback is lack of integration between the development and adoption sides of standardization processes (Fomin & Keil, 1999) , because these actors often play a lesser role during adoption.
In the next section, we explore the value of our analysis by applying the four conceptual lenses to the IS innovation of CPFR. CPFR is particularly interesting for this study, because proponents have described it using all four labels: philosophy, methodology, technology, and standard.
THE CASE OF CPFR
Data for our analysis came from published sources and our fieldwork in a supply chain consisting of a large retailer and two suppliers in which CPFR was recently initiated. In CPFR, business partners (e.g., retailers and their suppliers or manufacturers and their suppliers) attempt to improve supply chain performance (e.g., on-time deliveries and lower inventory costs) by collaborating on sales and demand (order) forecasts. Thus, CPFR represents a solution to a particular category of interorganizational matching problems. The industry association, VICS (Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards Association), regularly convenes working groups to develop and publish CPFR guidelines and holds educational conferences for industry participants with the goal of establishing CPFR as a standardized industry practice.
The benefits of CPFR can be great (Seifert, 2003) . For example, the retailer we call Specialty Superstores claimed that CPFR improved its relationships with suppliers and reduced sales forecast error rates from 40% to 20% on average and to 1% with certain suppliers. Despite publication of CPFR standards documents and numerous reports of benefits, CPFR has not been adopted as widely as VICS expected and, thus, has not yet achieved its proponents' goal of becoming a standardized industry practice.
In the following, we describe the CPFR innovation through each of our four conceptual lenses, trying to keep the perspectives as distinct as possible. Then we discuss the overlaps and differences in the perspectives.
CPFR Described Through the
Philosophy Lens Proponents sometimes describe CPFR as a business philosophy. For example, a leading popularizer defined CPFR as "an initiative among all participants in the supply chain intended to improve the relationship among them through jointly managed planning processes and shared information" (Seifert, 2003, p. 30) . According to VICS, "CPFR is simply the latest embodiment of knowledge and experience that has been compiled to continually improve a company's internal efficiencies while increasing external effectiveness" (VICS, 2004d, p. 3, emphasis added) . By the phrase "simply the latest embodiment," VICS acknowledged that CPFR possibly is not the final result of a long prior career of industry participants trying to solve a common business problem through experimentation and discourse.
VICS was founded in 1986 to implement the Quick Response program in the soft goods industry (called Efficient Consumer Response in the food industry). These earlier visions, described as "a management approach" for effective supply chain coordination (RIS News, 2004, n.p.), were extremely broad, encompassing many specific philosophies (such as seasonless retailing), methodologies (cross-docking and forecasting), and technologies (EDI, point of sale technology using Universal Product Code scanning, etc.). The experience of supply chains attempting to realize these visions revealed numerous problems, leading to their progressive refinement and renaming as Continuous Replenishment, Vendor-Managed Inventory, Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment, and, most recently, Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment. This evolution and some of the practical problems that drove it are summarized in Table 2 .
In its current embodiment, the vision of CPFR is described as creating "collaborative relationships between buyers and sellers through co-managed processes and shared information. By integrating demand and supply side processes CPFR ® will improve efficiencies, increase sales, reduce fixed assets and working capital, and reduce inventory for the entire supply chain while satisfying customer needs" (www.cpfr.org, accessed June 15, 2004) . QR was envisioned as four levels of successively more sophisticated technologies and applications: (1) point-of-sale technology and price lookup, (2) automatic inventory replenishment and sales and inventory forecasting, (3) pre-and post-season planning and support for crossdocking, (4) seasonless retailing and the transfer of inventory management functions to suppliers.
Practical Experience:
Retailers did not implement QR according to those levels (Palmer & Markus, 2000) ; but of the complexity of the program, they picked and chose among its components. Although the early focus of QR was on the flow of materials (Heard, 1994) , the emphasis shifted to the flow of information as people came to view short lead times as the way to reduce inventory. As a result of experiments by companies like Procter & Gamble, Kmart, and Wal-Mart (Harvard Business School, 1995; Koch, 2002) , QR evolved into "the earliest example of continuous replenishment planning" (VICS, 2004d, p. 1).
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR)
Context:
Grocery industry (mid 1980s) Vision:
"The first robust initiative created to enable integration in the supply chain" (Barratt & Oliveira, 2001, p. 267) , ECR was an umbrella concept for efforts to provide better value for consumers while reducing costs for retailers and suppliers (Harris, Swatman & Kurnia, 1997; Palmer & Markus, 2000) . ECR promised to move the supply chain from a push to a pull system with replenishment based on store point-of-sale data. ECR focused on trust-based relationships and improvements in four core business processes: efficient store assortment, efficient promotions, efficient product introductions (together known as category management on the demand side); and efficient replenishment, or supply chain management on the supply side. Benefits were expected to result from combining the demand and the supply side into a single framework. ECR also involved the use of enabling technologies for capturing and transmitting point-of-sale data (Universal Product Codes, scanners, and EDI); Activity-Based Costing and cross-docking were also recommended. Practical Experience:
Although ECR was a much broader concept, it often was implemented solely as Continuous Replenishment Planning/Vendor Managed Inventory (Mathews, 1994a (Mathews, , 1994b , with the problems noted in the following.
Table 2. Evolution of the CPFR supply chain innovation
than as a management approach or initiative) as a methodology with the core objective of establishing "a common process that can be used not only between two trading partners, but across an entire marketplace" (VICS, 2004a, p. 21 
Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI)
Context:
Consumer product retailing and grocery Vision:
In CR/CRP/VMI, suppliers automatically replenished retailers' inventory without orders, based on point-of-sale data. Practical Experience:
CR/CRP/VMI did not solve the problems they were intended to solve (Barratt & Oliveira, 2001; Bruce & Ireland, 2002) . Warehouse data were often used in lieu of point-of-sale data, thus reducing the visibility of actual consumer demand (Holmstrom et al., 2002) . Vendors often did not push retailer data back into their organizations to improve their own production and replenishment systems. VMI was not viewed as an appropriate approach for innovative products, for which demand cannot be predicted from past sales (Fisher, 1997; Sandoe, Corbitt & Boykin, 2001) or for products that the retailer planned to promote. "VMI … shifted the ownership and responsibility from retailer to supplier" (Bruce & Ireland, 2000, p. 4) , which some vendors believe is not in their best interests unless the partners can come to an equitable agreement on responsibility for shrink [i.e., theft] (Frankel et al., 2002, p. 64) . Marketing promotions and new product introductions involve demand uncertainty not addressed by basing replenishment on history data and inventory balances. Wal-Mart and Warner-Lambert began experimenting to address problems with VMI, resulting in Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment (CFaR).
Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment (CFaR)
Context:
Consumer product retailing and grocery (1995) Vision:
CFaR added sales and order forecasts to CRP. CFaR is "a formalized way for manufacturers and retailers to collaborate on future demand for products. By posting selected internal data on a shared Web server, supply chain partners could share and jointly develop more accurate forecasts" (Verity, 1997, p. 12) . CFaR also can involve the sharing of partners' strategies or the use of complex decision models (Raghunathan, 1999) . Practical Experience:
Although it provided considerable benefits to retailers and manufacturers (Caldwell, Stein & McGee, 1996) , CFaR still fell short of proponents' visions of supply chain management excellence. They began to promote CPFR.
Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR)
Context:
Consumer products retailing and supply chain management (1998) Vision:
CPFR is "an initiative among all participants in the supply chain intended to improve the relationship among them through jointly managed planning processes and shared information" (Seifert, 2003, p. 30) . CPFR went beyond CFaR by "enabl[ing] the forecast calculation to incorporate specific information about how much of an item will actually be available for delivery at some future date" (Verity, 1997, p. 12) . Thus, CPFR is seen as the successor of CFaR (Barratt, 2004) and as a further refinement of ECR (Seifert, 2003) .
Table 2. (cont.)
Some analysts argued that following the nine steps faithfully was key to supply chain collaboration success (Barratt & Oliveira, 2001 ). However, it soon appeared that "quite a few companies are collaborating with critical partners in a manner that is less complete than the full CPFR process" (Seifert, 2003, p. 90) . For many CPFR adopters, a major sticking point is step 5-create order forecast. Although some retailers can produce reliable order forecasts at the level required by the nine-step model (by distribution center and store), others cannot. For instance, Specialty Superstores lacks software powerful enough to forecast orders for its 10 million SKU-store combinations. (Over a 104-week planning horizon, order forecasting would require more than 1 trillion data records.) Consequently, some experts argued for new collaboration approaches that did not depend on retailers' abilities to generate order forecasts (Holmstrom et al., 2002) .
Even when retailers can produce accurate order forecasts, they might choose not to implement the full nine-step model with all suppliers or for all products. Specialty Superstores do not conduct CPFR processes for products of minor strategic importance. Furthermore, for innovative products (Fisher, 1997) of high strategic value, Specialty Superstores uses ladder plans (manual forecasts in which estimates of future orders gradually are refined as sales data become available) instead of CPFR. As a result, Specialty Superstores conducts the CPFR process with only 2% of its more than 500 vendors on less than 2,000 of its more than 10,000 stock-keeping units (SKUs). In addition, Specialty Superstores conducts two forms of collaboration, dubbed CPFR Heavy and CPFR Lite. CPFR Heavy involves weekly performance of a series of daily activities consistent with the CPFR nine-step model. In CPFR Lite, Specialty Superstore uploads sales forecasts to its CPFR software; sales and inventory data are posted on an extranet for vendors to use as they wish.
From experiences like these, CPFR promoters realized that collaboration did not require all nine steps of the original CPFR model (Seifert, 2003) nor did all companies need to use the same combinations of steps to perform CPFR. In the current version of the CPFR Process Model (VICS, 2004a) (see Figure 2) , the nine required steps have been replaced with four activities (strategy and planning, demand and supply management, execution, and analysis) comprising eight tasks (account planning, market planning, market data analysis, demand planning, production and supply planning, logistics/distribution, execution monitoring, and customer scorecard). The new model was designed to account for the fact that "most companies are involved in all of [the activities] at any point in time. There is no predetermined sequence of steps. …collaboration may focus on just a subset of the four activities … These partial implementations are sometimes called 'CPFR Lite'" (VICS, 2004a, p. 7, emphasis added) .
The latest VICS model also describes four CPFR scenarios that further adapt the collaboration approach to particular needs: Retail Event Collaboration, Distribution Center Replenishment Collaboration, Store Replenishment Collaboration, and Collaborative Assortment Planning. Indeed, "trading partners are free to combine scenarios if appropriate" (VICS, 2004a, p. 13) .
CPFR Described Through the
Technology Lens According to VICS, "the CPFR process does not fundamentally depend upon technology" (VICS, 2004b , p. 20). Indeed, Romanow (2004 contends that early-stage CPFR collaborations are adequately managed with limited technology, such as telephone, FAX, and e-mailed spreadsheets (p. 2). Although experimenting with CPFR does not require advanced information technology, "specialized technology can make the process more scalable" (VICS, 2004b, p. 20) ; that is, expandable to additional partners and SKUs. Indeed, several vendors (i.e., Manugistics, SAP, i2, and Retek's Syncra) offer CPFR software packages that automate or facilitate collaboration activities, making them more cost effective. Even though Specialty Superstores considers CPFR to be "80% business process and only 20% technology," the company purchased CPFR software to expand its collaborative planning efforts to more vendors and items. In general, the availability of a limited number of CPFR tools from well-established vendors appears to promote widespread adoption of CPFR and its infusion (use with more partners and items) within adopting organizations.
At the level of technical infrastructure, however, potential CPFR adopters face a bewildering variety of non-standardized implementation approaches-a factor likely to retard CPFR adoption and diffusion. For example, "the selection of data transport, security scheme, and middleware is beyond the scope of the CPFR standard, however, and is subject to implementers' agreements" (VICS, 2004b, p. 82) . "Trad- ing partners can use EDI messages, XML messages, or both to facilitate CPFR communications … The EAN.UCC Global Business Standard provides the most comprehensive coverage of the process, with a suite of eleven CPFR-specific XML message types. While there are no EDI mappings for some CPFR messages, some projects use XML to 'fill in' where EDI messages have gaps" (VICS, 2004a, p. 21) . Collaborating partners also can deploy a CPFR application in a shared mode in which partners use the same tool via an extranet, an application service provider, or an electronic marketplace, or they can share data across different applications using a peerto-peer architecture (e.g., company-tocompany, company-to-marketplace, marketplace-to-marketplace) (VICS, 2004c) . As a consequence of all these options, a "company may need to deploy CPFR using more than one approach to collaborate with its full set of trading partners" (VICS, 2004c, p. 4, emphasis added) .
In addition, CPFR adopters need to integrate CPFR tools with their other data processing systems (see Seifert [2003] for a more complete discussion.) At Specialty Superstores, CPFR software must work with (1) an enterprise data warehouse fed by sales, inventory, and ordering systems; (2) an extranet used to communicate point of sale data, inventory levels, and order status data to suppliers; and (3) order forecasting software. Specialty Superstores and its partners currently use manual processes to bridge gaps among these components. Although technical integration undoubtedly will increase over time, technology factors currently limit Specialty's ability to expand the CPFR innovation.
Standards Lens Proponents frequently describe CPFR in terms of standards. For example, CPFR is called a standards-based innovation (Seifert, 2003) , because it depends heavily on EDI and XML standards. Indeed, the CPFR Technical Specification describes four areas in which technical standards could apply:
1. Data content and format (EDI and SIL [Standard Interchange Language]) 2. Communication vehicle (FTP [transport] and TCP/IP [network protocol]) 3. Security measures (e.g., authentication, encryption, non-repudiation, and origin) 4. Application/Middleware (alternatives for location, coordination, and management of the data processing elements [servers, agents]).
More importantly, CPFR is described as a standard because performing CPFR effectively is a matching problem requiring a limited range of solutions (de Vries, 1999) . Although many individual supply chains have experimented over time to develop the essential philosophies, procedures, and techniques of CPFR (and its precursors), industry participants long have seen the need for CPFR standards, because without them, full employment of CPFR would involve the inefficient and ineffective use of different methodologies and technologies with different partners. Such a situation occurred with the EDI innovation (Damsgaard & Truex, 2000) , and many experts believed that it retarded the diffusion and infusion of EDI. With respect to CPFR, Johnson (2004) noted that without standardization, supply chain collaboration with three partners could mean three interfaces and three processes; whereas, with standards, collaboration with three partners could require only one interface and one process. In addition, as already noted, VICS (2004c) reported that today's CPFR arrangements are not fully standardized, because they require some companies to maintain different processes and technologies with different partners. In addition, because CPFR is performed jointly by pairs of organizations, the innovation involves direct network effects that are consequential for its widespread diffusion (David & Greenstein, 1990) .
The VICS organization can clearly be viewed as a developer of sectoral standards (de Vries, forthcoming). Since its founding in 1986, VICS has provided a forum in which industry participants come together to design and/or select among the philosophies, methodologies, and technologies devised by industry participants, consultants, and vendors. VICS' conferences have helped to educate industry participants, promoting the diffusion of CPFR, and its activities have helped to encourage technology providers to develop appropriate enabling technologies. For example, VICS developed mandatory common data formats and specifications for message interchange; commercial CPFR packages have implemented these formats.
Comparing the Lenses on CPFR
The philosophy lens draws attention to CPFR's long evolutionary career, in which the vision changed in response to practical experience. Similar insights might be generated by the view of standards as an emergent process; however, focusing only on the formal standards development activities of the VICS organization might not have revealed the full extent to which practical experiences of adopters disconfirmed earlier supply chain management philosophies.
On the other hand, standards theory sheds light on the specific shape of the CPFR career. The philosophy lens applies to all innovations, whether or not they involve matching problems with a concomitant requirement for a limited solution set that meets the needs of all parties concerned. The standards lens calls attention to matching problems and their solutions and, therefore, helps explain why CPFR's precursors failed in practice. For example, QR and ECR provided a too-broad set of solutions, which overwhelmed potential adopters and retarded diffusion (Frankel, Goldsby, & Whipple, 2002) . For another example, VMI "shifted the ownership and responsibility from retailer to supplier" (Bruce & Ireland, 2002, p. 4) , which some vendors believe is not in their best interests unless the partners can come to an equitable agreement on responsibility for "shrink" (i.e., theft) (Frankel et al., 2002, p. 64) .
The methodology lens highlights the challenges of implementing an innovation that was believed to require several parties to follow an exact, step-by-step procedure jointly. Some supply chains found that the 1998 nine-step VICS model did not fit their collaboration scenarios; some retailers found that they could not comply with the required step of producing an order forecast. In order to increase the adoption of CPFR, VICS eliminated the prescribed sequence of activities and introduced four new scenarios, allowing supply chains greater flexibility to customize the CPFR process. The methodology literature would have predicted the move toward greater flexibility, but standards theory would not have. After all, by increasing the customizability of the CPFR methodology, VICS also was increasing the likelihood that CPFR would never achieve standardization in practice, because even though more companies might adopt a flexible CPFR, many more adopters would find themselves performing the flexible CPFR process differently with different partners.
The challenge of methodology standardization (e.g., IT Service Management [http://www.itil-itsm-world.com/]) has not figured prominently in the standards literature. Brunsson et al. (2000) described a methodology standardization effort (ISO 9000 quality standards) in which step-bystep implementation was never intended. However, that standard was not designed for joint implementation by two or more companies-it was a standard for individual companies to implement alone. By contrast, CPFR is meant for joint deployment by two or more organizations and, therefore, exhibits direct network effects. Consequently, flexibility in CPFR procedures is much more likely than in ISO 9000 standards to hinder standardization in practice. (A similar situation was seen in the case of EDI standards [Damsgaard & Truex, 2000] ).
On the other hand, the standards lens helps explain how and why the nine-step CPFR methodology broke down. As already explained, Specialty Superstores could not automatically produce the order forecasts required by the nine-step methodology because of its huge number of store-SKU combinations. For many retailers, however, a more fundamental problem was that they did not have the incentive to provide order forecasts to suppliers (Holmstrom et al., 2002) . Retailers do not need to forecast orders for their own immediate purposes (although they do need to forecast sales). If not for concerns about the timeliness of suppliers' deliveries, most retailers would not forecast orders but instead would place orders as the need arose. (Even so, some retailers prefer not to place orders, requiring suppliers to make replenishment decisions based on retailers' pointof-sale data.) By contrast, suppliers benefit from having information about retailers' future orders, because that information helps them schedule production efficiently. The nine-step CPFR process did not adequately balance these divergent needs of suppliers and retailers. Greater flexibility in the methodology balanced those needs better. By explaining the evolution of the CPFR methodology toward flexibility in terms of greater balance, the standards lens adds analytic value to the methodology lens.
The technology lens on CPFR highlights important differences between tools like CPFR software and technical infrastructure issues (i.e., deployment alternatives and integration with back-end systems). Standardization of data and message formats is necessary for widespread adoption of CPFR, and since vendors have adopted VICS standards, a dominant design for CPFR software is likely to emerge through market processes. However, the technology lens shows that tool standardization is not sufficient for CPFR to become a standardized business practice because of nonstandardized elements introduced by voluntary technical infrastructure choices.
On the other hand, by focusing on the matching problem and (in the case of CPFR) direct network effects from interdependent use, the standards lens explains precisely how and why non-standardized infrastructure elements threaten CPFR's prospects for adoption. Consider the situation of Consumer Products Manufacturer (CPM), a company that supplies Specialty Superstores and several of its competitors. CPM collaborates with about six different partners and, by the law of averages, finds itself forced to use every major CPFR software package on the market as well as numerous low-tech approaches, such as emailed spreadsheets. Even when two of CPM's customers use the same CPFR package, they use it in different ways. One retailer might provide order forecasts; the other may not. In addition, the retailers' forecast data might reflect different time periods and different levels of granularity (SKU, SKU-distribution center combination, SKU-store combination). CPM's IS specialists are required to develop and maintain a variety of special-purpose programs to extract data sent by retailers and load it into CPM's systems. (Considerable manual effort is devoted to this task every week.) Once that is done, CPM's supply chain analysts must review and analyze separately each retailer's data to account for differences in data quantity and quality. Although CPM believes that the benefits of collaborating with its customers outweigh the costs of nonstandard technologies and business processes, Specialty Superstores told us that other similar suppliers declined to participate in CPFR, because in the absence of Specialty's ability to supply an order forecast, the suppliers' perceived costs of performing CPFR exceeded their potential benefits.
In short, the four lenses overlap to a certain degree. However, each lens provides unique and important insights in the complex case of CPFR. Consequently, they are best used together.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our comparison of the four perspectives on the IS innovation of CPFR suggests three conclusions. First, there is value in combining both the emergent and the formal design/selection perspectives on the development of standards. The process by which formal standards evolve through experimentation in practice can enhance insights derived from a focus on the official efforts of standards bodies such as the industry association VICS. Similarly, as suggested by Fomin and Keil (1999) , there is value in combining a focus on both the development/evolution of standards and on their adoption and diffusion. Implicit or explicit choices made during standards development can have important consequences for the extent of standards diffusion and its assimilation by adopting organizations.
Second, all four conceptual lenses shed light on the case of CPFR. Although not all IS innovations might be describable in all four ways, our analysis suggests that methodologies face different standardization challenges than technologies do. IS methodology standards face challenges around customization; IS tool standards face particular issues around integration with processes and infrastructures and around potential divergence between tool standardization and infrastructure standardization. Although the ultimate goal of standards theory is to account for all standardization efforts, it is important not to ignore differences in what is standardized that could produce variations in standardization processes and outcomes.
Finally, the case of CPFR raises an interesting question about what it takes for complex IS innovations to achieve standard-ization in practice. CPFR appears to be not yet standardized at any level of abstraction-philosophy, methodology, or technology. But what if it were standardized at only one level or two? Could CPFR be standardized in practice without standardization at every level? This, we believe, is an interesting question for future research on the standardization of IS innovations.
